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I. Introduction
Two approaches have been used in the literature to detect gender bias in the
intrahousehold allocation of consumption or expenditure: the direct comparison
of expenditure on males and females where data are available at the level of
the individual and the indirect household expenditure methodology, commonly
referred to as the Engel curve approach. Since information on the consumption
of or expenditure on each individual member of a household is typically not
available in household surveys (where generally only total household expen-
diture on specific items is available), it is usually not possible to directly
observe gender bias in the allocation of expenditure within the household. A
researcher must therefore use an indirect method. The Engel curve method
seeks to detect differential treatment within the household indirectly by ex-
amining how household expenditure on a particular good changes with house-
hold gender composition.
However, the reliability of the Engel curve methodology as a way of detecting
gender bias has been called into question because it has generally failed to
confirm discrimination even where it is known to exist (Deaton 1997,
239–41).1 Deaton notes that “it is a puzzle that expenditure patterns so con-
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1 For example, the use of the Engel curve method failed to detect significant differential treatment
in the intrahousehold distribution of food consumption in Maharashtra (Subramanian and Deaton
1990) and also in Thailand and Cote d’Ivoire (Deaton 1989). It might be thought that much
better laboratories to test the Engel curve techniques are provided by Indian states such as Rajasthan,
Haryana, and Punjab, with their very skewed sex ratios, or from Bangladesh and Pakistan, two
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sistently fail to show strong gender effects even when measures of outcomes
show differences between girls and boys” (240). Case and Deaton (2003, 11)
say “it is not clear whether there really is no discrimination or whether, for
some reason that is unclear, the method simply does not work.” Ahmad and
Morduch (2002, 17) say, “coupled with evidence on [significant gender dif-
ferences in] mortality and health outcomes, the results on household expen-
ditures pose a challenge in understanding consumer behaviour.”
This article tests two potential reasons for this puzzle. First, there are two
possible channels through which pro-male bias may occur in expenditure on
any particular commodity: (1) via zero purchases for daughters and positive
purchases for sons and (2) conditional on positive purchase for both daughters
and sons, via lower expenditure on daughters than on sons. If gender bias
operates through only one of these mechanisms, then averaging across the two
mechanisms may lead to the conclusion of no significant gender bias. Second,
there is the issue of the effect of aggregation (of expenditure data across
individuals within the household) on the ability to detect gender bias in
household expenditures. It may be that somehow aggregation mutes gender
effects.
On the first issue, suppose that bias against girls in education takes the
form mainly of zero expenditure on girls’ education (nonenrollment of girls)
but that, conditional on enrollment, expenditure on girls’ education is similar
to that on boys or even somewhat exceeds that on boys—for, say, sample
selectivity reasons or because certain components of expenditure on girls’ ed-
ucation are higher than those on boys (e.g., expenditure on school transport
and clothing). Then, averaging across these two mechanisms, there may not
be significant gender bias but, via the nonenrollment mechanism only, there
may be strong bias. Thus, one would be interested in asking whether significant
bias occurs via either of the two mechanisms separately and whether it is the
averaging across the two mechanisms that leads to the conclusion of nonbias.
One would be interested not only in the average unconditional expenditure
on girls and boys but also in the distribution of the expenditure.2
countries from which comes much of the other evidence on differential treatment by gender.
However, a study by Subramanian (1995) failed to find evidence of gender bias in these three
Indian states. Similarly, Ahmad and Morduch (2002) found no evidence in favor of boys in Bang-
ladesh, even though the survey they use itself shows that there is an excess of boys over girls of
11%. A similar finding of roughly identical treatment of boys and girls is confirmed for Pakistan
(Deaton 1997, 240; Bhalotra and Attfield 1998) and with 1999–2000 NSS data for India (Case
and Deaton 2003).
2 Another reason why the conventional application of the Engel curve method might fail to pick
up discrimination against girls, even when in fact it exists, is that the distributional assumption
about the dependent variable and thus the specification of the budget share equation could be
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Second, the failure of the conventional approach to detect gender discrim-
ination may have to do with the aggregate nature of the data employed in
the method. Even expenditure on an individually assignable good such as
education is at best typically available only at the household level, though it
is, in principle, more readily measurable on an individual basis than food
expenditure. It could be that somehow household-level analysis mutes gender
effects. It could also be that the way in which household gender-age com-
position variables are defined makes it difficult to pick up discrimination.
Much of the work using Engel curve methods has focused on detecting
gender bias in the allocation of food. Our focus here is on detecting gender
bias in the allocation of education. Previous work on India on the allocation
of education expenditure using Engel curve methods has generally failed to
find consistent evidence of gender bias. For example, Subramanian and Deaton
(1991) find that, in National Sample Survey (NSS) data from rural Maharashtra,
there is no evidence of pro-boy gender bias in educational expenditure in the
5–9 and 15–54 age groups, though there is weak evidence of bias in the
10–14 age group. Using similar NSS data from a decade later, Lancaster,
Maitra, and Ray (2003) do find significant gender difference in educational
expenditure in rural Bihar and rural Maharashtra in the 10–16 age group but
not in urban areas and not in the primary school 6–9 age group. In his study
of five Indian states, Subramanian (1995, 17) wondered “how [to] explain the
finding of discrimination against females under [age] 14 in only two states,
when school enrolment data suggest discrimination is pervasive?”
Ahmad and Morduch (2002) provide some possible frameworks to explain
the lack of evidence of gender bias in household consumption expenditures in
Bangladesh. One of their explanations is two-stage budgeting, namely, that
parents’ choices about aggregate expenditures are separable from their choices
about how those expenditures are allocated. That is, parents may not change
buying habits (budget share on a commodity might remain unchanged with
a change in gender composition of the household), but they might allot dif-
ferent portions of a commodity to sons than to daughters. This will not show
up in investigations of aggregate expenditures, but it will show up in inves-
tigations of individual outcomes. Another explanation for the failure to find
the expected gender bias in resource allocation is provided by differential
mortality selection (Rose 1999). Rose finds that excess mortality of girls in
wrong. For example, if the education budget share for households with positive education spending
is distributed log normally but, because the budget share equation is fitted on all (zero and positive
education budget share) households, one is obliged to use absolute budget share rather than the
log of budget share as the dependent variable. This would lead to incorrect standard errors. However,
this is not a particularly important worry in large samples such as ours.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.019 on June 07, 2017 04:35:31 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
412 economic development and cultural change
rural India is related to households’ inability to smooth consumption. If house-
holds sacrifice some daughters’ survival in order to cope with adverse shocks,
there may be no gender bias in resource allocations among surviving children
but this masks prior gender bias in mortality selection. Jensen (2002) suggests
a plausible explanation why gender inequality of outcomes need not arise from
inferior parental allocations to daughters than sons. If couples have a strong
desire for male offspring, they will continue childbearing until they have at
least one (or some given desired number of) sons. This kind of fertility behavior
will lead to girls having more siblings and larger household size than boys.
Because of fewer resources for each child in larger households, girls will be
worse off than boys, even in the absence of any differential treatment by parents.
This type of behavior means that household size will be endogenous. Of course,
with individual-level expenditure data, it is possible to test these explanations
of the apparent lack of gender bias, and I do so in this article.
The 1994 National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) rural
household survey of 16 major states in India collected data on individual
educational outcomes, that is, on school enrollment, years of schooling, and
education expenditure data, on each household member 35 years old or younger.
Thus, it is possible, using these data, to investigate gender bias in the allocation
of educational expenditure, both by direct examination of educational spending
on boys and girls and by the indirect Engel curve method. In other words, it
is possible to test whether the indirect, aggregate-data method confirms gender
bias in states where the direct individual-data method shows bias. A vindication
of the indirect methodology for detecting bias should be of considerable prac-
tical interest beyond this study and beyond India since most data sets only
permit the use of the indirect method.
Schooling has costs in India. Even apparently “free” government schooling
has substantial costs, such as expenditure on books, stationery, travel, and school
uniforms.3 Some studies have also shown that girls are less likely to be sent to
fee-charging private schools that are costlier (Dre`ze and Sen 1995, 133; Kingdon
1996a, 1996b). Our data show that the overwhelming majority (98%) of enrolled
5–19-year-olds have positive expenditure incurred on their education.
In this article, we find that the Engel curve method does fail to find evidence
of discrimination, even when significant boy-girl differences are manifest in
individual-level expenditure data. The research tests the two explanations for
3 Household survey data on educational spending show that even so-called fee-free schooling has
substantial costs in India. For instance, the PROBE report (Probe Team 1999, 16) found that, in
rural north India, parents spend about 318 rupees per year on each child who attends government
(i.e., tuition-free) school, so that an agricultural laborer in Bihar with three such children would
have to work for about 40 days of the year just to send the children to primary school.
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the failure that were outlined above. The first explanation is tested by separating
out the two mechanisms through which bias can occur to “unpack” the total
gender bias into its two components. The second potential explanation, namely,
that aggregation is responsible for the failure to find significant gender bias,
is tested by examining whether the effects of gender variables in an education
expenditure equation at the household level are similar to those in an equation
(with as similar a specification as possible) at the individual-child level. Section
II discusses the methodology, including both the Engel curve method and the
hurdle model. Section III discusses data and estimation issues. The results are
discussed in Section IV, and the final section concludes.
II. Indirect Methodology for Detecting Discrimination
The Engel curve method utilizes the fact that household composition is a
variable that exerts an effect on household consumption patterns. The needs
that arise with additional household members act in such a way as to increase
expenditure on items of consumption associated with the additional member.
The approach examines whether budget share of a good consumed by, say,
children (such as education), rises as much when an additional girl is added
to the household as when an additional boy is added, in a given age range.
The approach is to estimate an Engel curve for the commodity being examined,
education in the present case. While there are many possible functional forms
for the Engel curve linking expenditure on a good to total expenditure, the
Working and Leser specification has the theoretical advantage of being consistent
with a utility function and its postulation of a linear relationship between budget
share of a good and the log of total expenditure conforms to the data in a wide
range of circumstances (Deaton 1997). We use the Working and Leser speci-
fication but—so as not to prejudge the issue—later relax it to allow for non-
linearity in the shape of the Engel curve. Working’s Engel curve can be extended
to include household demographic composition by writing
J1
s p a b ln (x /n ) g ln n  v (n /n ) hz  u , (1)i i i i j ji i i i[ ]jp1
where is total expenditure of household i; is the budget share of educationx si i
is household size; zi is a vector of other household characteristicseduexp/x ; n1 i
such as religion, caste, and household head’s education and occupation; and ui
is the error term. The term allows for an independent scale effect forln ni
household size, while refers to the Jth age-gender class within thejp 1, ... , J
household and is the fraction of household members in the jth age-gendern /nji i
class. Since these fractions add up to unity, one of them is omitted from the
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regression. In this article, there are 14 age-sex categories. These are males and
females in age groups 0–4 years, 5–9 years, 10–14 years, 15–19 years, 20–24
years, 25–60 years, and age 61 and above. The fraction of women age 61 years
or older in the household is the omitted category. The variables of most interest
pertain to persons of school-going age, that is, they are fractions of males and
females aged 5–9, 10–14, and 15–19 in the household. These variables are
named M5to9, F5to9, M10to14, F10to14, M15to19, and F15to19, respectively.
The coefficients represent the effects (on budget share) of changing householdvj
composition while holding household size constant, for example, by replacing
a child in a younger age group with one in an older age group or replacing a
man by a woman in a given age category. Testing for gender differences simply
involves testing the hypothesis that , where the subscripts m and f arev p vjm jf
the gender groups male and female and the subscript j refers to the age group.
Thus, testing for gender difference in educational expenditure in the 5–9 age
group will involve testing whether the coefficient on M5to9 is significantly
different from the coefficient on F5to9.
The above method has been used to fit the budget share equations for a
wide range of commodities, including food items, clothing, and medical and
educational expenses. Conventionally, the model has been fitted on the sample
of all households, irrespective of whether they incurred zero or positive ex-
penditure on the particular commodity. Much of the extant Engel curve lit-
erature has not conditioned on zero values, that is, it includes both zero and
positive values of the dependent variable, the budget share. For example,
Subramanian (1995) and Subramanian and Deaton (1990) fit OLS Engel curves
on the sample of all households, despite the preponderance of households with
zero education budget share (89% and 70% of households had zero education
budget shares in these studies, respectively).4
Given censoring of the dependent variable (education budget share) at zero
for a large percentage of the sample households, an important estimation issue
is the choice of the appropriate statistical model. While the extant literature
has used OLS, in much of the applied econometrics literature, there is a well-
4 Some studies have used flexible-form or semi/nonparametric regression, e.g., Bhalotra and Attfield
(1998). In Subramanian and Deaton (1990), only 11% of rural Maharashtran households reported
positive educational expenditures. In Subramanian’s (1995) study, using 1987–88 data, only 30%
of rural Maharashtran households had positive spending on education. In the current NCAER data,
56% of rural Maharashtran households incurred some education spending. In Subramanian (1995),
in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, 21%, 56%, 51%, and 23% of households,
respectively, reported positive education spending. In the current NCAER data, the corresponding
figures are 49%, 64%, 58%, and 55%, respectively. That is, between 1988 and 1994, the proportion
of rural households incurring positive spending on education rose quite sharply.
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justified reluctance to include both zero and positive values in an OLS regression
because of the biased estimates that result. A standard solution often suggested
is the use of a Tobit model. However, apart from the potentially severe problem
of heteroskedasticity (Deaton 1997), an important limitation of the Tobit (as
well as of the suggested alternative, namely, a partially nonparametric censored
least absolute deviation or CLAD estimator) is that it assumes that a single
mechanism determines the choice between versus . In particular,sp 0 s 1 0
and are constrained to have the same sign.P(s 1 0Fx)/x E(sFx, s 1 0)/xj j
The alternatives to censored Tobit that allow the initial decision of sp 0
versus to be separate from the decision of how much s is, given thats 1 0 s 1
, are called hurdle models (Wooldridge 2002, 536). These models allow the0
effect of a variable to differently affect the decision to incur any expenditure
( vs. ) and how much to spend ( ). The hurdle or first tier issp 0 s 1 0 sFs 1 0
whether or not to choose positive s. In addition to estimating the conventional
Engel curve equation, I propose to use hurdle model estimation to allow the
decision of whether to incur any education expenditure to be modeled separately
from the decision of how much to spend on education, conditional on spending
anything. The simple hurdle model used is
P(sp 0Fx)p 1F(xg), (2)
2log (s)F(x, s 1 0) ∼ Normal(xb,j ), (3)
where s is the (total household, not per capita) budget share of education, x is
a vector of explanatory variables, and are parameters to be estimated, andg b
is the standard deviation of s. Equation (2) stipulates the probability that s isj
zero or positive, and equation (3) states that, conditional on , followss 1 0 sFx
a log normal distribution. An examination of the distribution of s shows that,
conditional on positive education spending, s is log normally rather than normally
distributed.
The maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of is simply the probit estimatorg
using versus binary response. The MLE of is just the OLSsp 0 s 1 0 b
estimator from the regression of on x, using those observations for whichlog (s)
. A consistent estimator of is the usual standard error from the latterˆs 1 0 j
regression. Estimation is straightforward because we assume that, conditional
on follows a classical linear model. The conditional expectations 1 0, log (s)
of and the unconditional expectation of are easy to obtainE(sFx, s 1 0) E(sFx)
using properties of the log normal distribution:
2E(sFx, s 1 0)p exp (xb j /2), (4)
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2E(sFx)p F(xg) exp (xb j /2), (5)
and these are easily estimated, given , , and . The marginal effect of x onˆ ˆ ˆb j g
s can be obtained by transforming the marginal effect of x on , usinglog (s)
the exponent. Thus, the marginal effect of x on s in the OLS regression of
conditional on is obtained by taking the derivative of the con-log (s) s 1 0
ditional expectation of s with respect to x:
E(sFx, s 1 0)
2p b 7 exp (xb j /2). (6)
x
The marginal effect of a variable x on s, taking into account the effect of x
on both the probability that and on the size of s conditional ons 1 0 s 1 0,
is obtained by taking the derivative of the unconditional expectation of s with
respect to x. Differentiating (5), using the product rule, we have
E(sFx)
2 2p gf(xg) exp (xb j /2)F(xg)b 7 exp (xb j /2)
x
2p [gf(xg)F(xg)b] 7 exp (xb j /2), (7)
where is the standard normal density function and is the cumulativef(.) F(.)
normal distribution function.
It is possible that in the conditional OLS equation of will sufferb log (s)
from sample selectivity bias. We are particularly concerned to see whether
the coefficients on the male and female demographic variables, such as pro-
portion of males ages 5–9 in the household (M5to9), proportion of females
ages 5–9 (F5to9), and so forth, suffer from selectivity bias, as that would
have implications for our measure of gender bias in educational spending.
If both male and female demographic variables are equally affected by se-
lectivity bias, then there will be no underestimation or overestimation in
the measurement of gender bias. However, if unobserved characteristics, such
as child ability, child motivation, and parental attitudes, have a greater
influence in enrollment decisions about daughters than sons, then sample
selectivity bias in the coefficients of the female demographic variables will
be greater than for males and this will lead to an overestimation of pro-male
gender bias.
This can be shown by focusing on any one pair of demographic variables,
for example, M5to9 and F5to9. Suppose that a girl’s ability is an important
unobserved trait that determines both whether positive expenditure is incurred
on her schooling and how much is spent on her schooling, conditional on
positive education spending. Suppose that, for boys, ability does not matter
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(or matters less) to those two decisions. Thus, girls’ ability is an element of
the error term both in the probit equation of positive education spending and
the OLS equation of conditional education spending for girls. Suppose that
the effect of F5to9 is positive in both probit and conditional OLS equations,
that is, the greater the proportion of 5–9-year-old females in the household,
the greater is the likelihood of the household incurring positive education
expenditure and the higher the conditional education expenditure (or education
budget share). Now, if the observed F5to9 variable is very large, the household
will be almost certain to incur positive education spending. But suppose that,
on the basis of the size of the observed variable F5to9, the household is equally
likely to have positive education spending as to have zero education spending;
then the ability of girls in the household (unobserved to us but observed to
parents) will determine whether the household has positive or zero education
spending. If the girls in a household have high ability, that household will
be observed to have positive education spending, and if they have low ability,
the household will not incur positive education spending. Thus, at high values
of F5to9, there is no correlation between ability and F5to9, but at low levels
of F5to9, there is a negative correlation between ability and F5to9, that is,
( ). Averaging over all households, the correlation between theCorr(x, u) ! 0
explanatory variable (F5to9) and the error term is not equal to zero
( ) and, in fact, the correlation is negative; this implies a violationCorr(x, u)( 0
of the basic assumptions of the classical linear regression model, and there will
be endogenous sample selection bias. Due to this negative correlation, the
coefficient of F5to9 in the conditional OLS equation of education expenditure
will be biased downward. If the coefficient on the corresponding male de-
mographic variable (M5to9) does not suffer from selectivity bias or suffers
from it less than the female variable (as is likely), then any pro-male bias will
be overestimated.
An important issue is the potential endogeneity of fertility and thus of
household size (Browning 1992). Use of the Engel curve method requires that
the number of children and household size be exogenous, but household size
is itself likely to be determined by education budget-share decisions: for in-
stance, couples with higher taste for schooling may choose to have smaller
families. Household size may also be endogenous if son preference that affects
budget-share decisions also results in differences in household size by the sex-
composition of early-born children (Jensen 2002). Alluding to such difficulties
in modeling the effects of children on various economic decisions, Browning
(1992, 1435) testifies to “how difficult it is to draw any robust and credible
inferences in this area of economics.” However, use of family fixed effects in
this article provides a powerful way to control for unobserved factors such as
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parental tastes and preferences that cause household size to be endogenous. I
examine whether endogeneity of household size alters the results on gender
bias by estimating individual-level education expenditure equations with and
without family fixed effects.
Another estimation issue is the potential endogeneity of household per capita
expenditure in the education budget-share equation 1.5 In my specification,
endogeneity remains possible since household expenditure reflects labor, sav-
ings, and other consumption decisions made at the same time as the choice
of education budget share: parents who have higher aspirations for their chil-
dren’s education may work harder to generate income to pay for school fees,
and so forth. Endogeneity of per capita expenditure is sought to be addressed
with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, using land ownership and
nonearned income as identifying instruments after testing for their validity.
In the final analysis, however, OLS is used because the Hausman-Wu test failed
to reject exogeneity of per capita expenditure in the majority of states.
The analysis will proceed as follows. I will estimate the marginal effect of
the male and female demographic variables in the conventional OLS model
of the budget share of education in order to compare my results with extant
studies. I will also estimate the marginal effects of the demographic variables
in a hurdle model, that is, in each of its two tiers—the binary probit of
whether the household incurs positive education expenditure and an OLS of
household education spending, conditional on spending a positive amount.
The marginal effects will be computed using STATA. The main object of
interest is to see whether the difference in the marginal effects of the male
and female demographic variables is statistically significant in each age group.
III. Data and Estimation Issues
This study uses household survey data collected by the National Council of
Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi. This 1994 survey covered
33,230 households across 16 major states in India. Sampling information and
other details about the data set are available in Shariff (1999).
The major advantage of this data set is its detailed information on education
of each person aged 35 or less in the household, including educational ex-
penditure information. However, an important drawback is that it did not
collect comprehensive information on total household expenditure. Only house-
5 Deolalikar and Rose (1998) and Rose (2000) show that, in rural South India, men and women’s
labor supply and household savings respond to child gender. We therefore expect household con-
sumption expenditure to also respond to child gender. However, since we control for sex directly,
this correlation is not the source of endogeneity bias here.
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hold expenditures on food, health, and education were collected. This implies
that the denominator in the budget share expression is not household total
expenditure but a (large) subset of it, namely, food, health, and education
(FHE) expenditure.6 The missing component of household total expenditure
is the non-FHE expenditure. This would include expenditure on items such
as fuel/energy, transport, housing, and entertainment. Given that we have data
only on FHE, differential treatment depends upon two components,
Eduexp Eduexp FHEexp
sp p # ,
Totalexp FHEexp Totalexp
that is, it depends on (1) how changes with more girls inEduexp/FHEexp
the household and (2) how FHEexp/Totalexp changes with more girls in the
household. We are able to model only the first component, that is, the share
of education expenditure in FHE expenditure. However, the combined FHE
share in total expenditure (i.e., the second component) is unlikely to rise with
the proportion of girls in the household. If it is the case that, with a greater
proportion of girls in the household, education expenditure falls but this
reduction is compensated for by an increase in food expenditure (which is the
overwhelming part of FHE expenditure), then one could doubt the evidence
from a test of component 1 only. However, there is little reason to suppose
that FHE expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure rises with proportion
of girls in the household. In fact, the contrary has often been suggested in the
literature, that is, it has been hypothesized that additional girls in the household
decrease the share of food expenditure in total expenditure. If the latter is
true, then the evidence here based on component 1 only would underestimate
gender bias. We believe that additional girls in the household are unlikely to
increase or decrease the share of food (or of FHE) expenditure in total household
expenditure; it is most likely that the effect is neutral.7 In other words, mod-
eling how the share of education in FHE expenditure changes with household
gender composition should neither under- nor overestimate gender bias in the
allocation of education expenditure. Thus, although we use the budget subshare
of education in this article for simplicity, we refer to it simply as the budget
share of education.
The analysis here is limited to households that have children of school-
going age, that is, those with children aged 5–19. This yields a sample of
6 We know from Subramanian’s (1995) study that, in 1987–88 in five Indian states, food, health,
and education expenditure together accounted for about 63% of total household expenditure.
7 None of the several extant studies provides any convincing evidence of systematic gender bias
in food allocation within Indian households.
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25,954 households. In this sample, the mean budget share of education is
4.40% and the percentage of households with zero education spending is 31%.8
IV. Discussion of Results
We present the results in three subsections. The first explores gender bias by
means of descriptive statistics using individual-level data. The second examines
whether incorrect functional form is responsible for the failure of the conven-
tional Engel curve approach to detect gender bias. The third subsection asks
whether aggregation of data at the household level is to blame for the failure
of the Engel curve approach to detect gender bias.
A. Descriptive Statistics
The second column of table 1 shows the sex ratio in the 0–14 age group in
sample households. It shows that the proportion of girls is only 46.4% in
rural India, but it also shows considerable variation across states, with Bihar,
Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Assam having lower pro-
portions of girls than the all-India average.9 This gives us our prior belief that
gender difference in the intrahousehold allocation of educational expenditure
is likely to be strongest in these states.
In the remaining columns of table 1, we divide all households with children
less than 15 years of age into two groups—all-girl households, where all the
8 The mean budget share of education percentage is considerably higher than the budget share of
education in previous studies on India. For example, the average budget share of education for the
five Indian states studied in Subramanian (1995) was 1.34%. In our data, it is 3.69% for those
same five states. However, the data used in the two studies are not comparable because, first, the
earlier studies do not restrict the sample to only households with children in school-going age
range. Second, as stated above, our denominator is not total household expenditure (as in Subra-
manian) but rather a subset of it, consisting only of food, medical, and educational expenditure.
In Subramanian’s NSS data on five states, these three expenditure items together constitute 63%
of total expenditure, so it is possible to “adjust” our education budget share by deflating it
appropriately ((3.69 # 63)/100). This yields a budget share of 2.32% for education, which, though
considerably higher than the 1.34% figure in Subramanian for the year 1987–88, is closer to the
2.87% figure for rural India in the Micro Impact of Macro and Adjustment Policies Survey of the
mid-1990s (Pradhan and Subramanian 2000, 27). The main explanation for the fact that the budget
share of education (s) in our data (2.32%) is greater than that in Subramanian’s study (1.34%) is
that the education budget share has increased between 1987–88 and 1994, the reference dates of
the data in the two studies. This is plausible because of (i) reductions in poverty over time (Dre`ze
and Srinivasan 1996, 4–5; Datt and Ravallion 1998, 30; Dubey and Gangopadhyay 1998) and (ii)
increased demand for and more widespread supply of education. That demand for education in-
creased may be gleaned by examining changes over time in the percentage of households that
incurred any positive educational expenditure. Figures available for rural Maharashtra at three
points in time—1983, 1988, and 1994—show that the percentage of households incurring positive
educational expenditures rose from 11% in 1983 to 30% in 1988 and further to 55% in 1994.
9 The figure for Assam seems implausibly low.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY STATE
State
(1)
Proportion of
Girls in All Children
(Ages 0–14)
(2)
Proportion of
All-Girl Households
in All Households
(3)
% of At-Least-One-Boy
Households That Incurred
Positive Education Expenditure
(4)
% of All-Girl
Households That Incurred
Positive Education Expenditure
(5)
Percentage Point
Difference (4  5)
(6)
t-Value of
the Difference
in 4 and 5
(7)
Andhra 48.1 25.6 62.8 48.9 13.9 4.8
Bihar 44.7a 17.1a 56.3 43.2 13.1 4.3
Gujarat 45.9a 17.8a 62.9 42.6 20.3a 5.5
Haryana 46.3a 15.5a 72.4 52.2 20.2a 5.7
Himachal 46.8 19.1 85.4 69.6 15.8 4.3
Karnatak 47.6 20.6 72.1 59.0 13.1 4.9
Kerala 50.2 28.9 72.1 58.7 13.4 4.2
Maharashtra 46.3a 19.2 69.2 48.3 20.9a 7.8
Madhya 46.4 18.5a 61.1 42.3 18.8a 8.6
Orissa 48.4 21.1 64.7 44.0 20.7a 6.7
Punjab 46.4 17.7a 70.5 46.5 24.0a 6.0
Rajasthan 45.0a 15.0a 67.9 32.3 35.6a 11.1
Tamilnadu 48.7 28.5 60.1 39.5 20.6a 6.2
Uttar 44.8a 15.0a 66.9 44.1 22.8a 9.6
West Bengal 49.2 20.4 60.2 42.8 17.4 5.1
Assam 39.6 12.2 62.4 55.6 6.8 1.5
All India 46.4 19.0 66.0 47.3 18.7 24.4
Note. The ﬁgures for Assam in the ﬁrst two columns are implausibly low. The states with the greatest expected gender bias are Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra,
Madhya, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.
a Value is above or below the national average.
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TABLE 2
CURRENT ENROLLMENT RATE OF CHILDREN BY AGE GROUP AND GENDER
State
Ages 5–9 Ages 10–14 Ages 15–19
Female Male Gap Female Male Gap Female Male Gap
Andhra 65 77 12* 57 70 13* 15 40 25*
Bihar 35 46 11* 50 64 14* 24 46 22*
Gujarat 57 65 8* 68 82 14* 24 44 20*
Haryana 55 60 5 70 85 15* 21 49 28*
Himachal 79 83 4 89 94 5 46 74 28*
Karnatak 60 64 4 64 74 10* 27 44 23*
Kerala 81 85 4 98 96 2 54 55 1
Maharashtra 69 70 1 71 85 14* 26 56 30*
Madhya 40 47 7* 52 69 17* 15 42 27*
Orissa 51 58 7* 56 76 20* 18 42 24*
Punjab 71 76 5 73 83 10* 26 45 19*
Rajasthan 32 58 26* 36 79 43* 9 46 37*
Tamilnadu 61 74 13* 67 80 13* 23 38 15*
Uttar 40 56 16* 49 72 23* 19 47 28*
West Bengal 47 48 1 62 66 4 25 40 15*
Assam 52 60 8* 77 86 9* 49 59 10*
All India 51 60 9* 60 76 16* 24 47 23*
* Gender gap is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
children below the age of 15 are girls, and at-least-one-boy households, where
there are one or more boys in the household. Table 1 shows quite a dramatic
difference in the percentage of households incurring positive educational spend-
ing, depending on whether it is an all-girl or at-least-one-boy household. It
shows that, in rural India, the percentage of all-girl households reporting
positive education spending is only 47.3%, whereas the corresponding per-
centage for at-least-one-boy households is 66.0%. In other words, all-girl
households are nearly 19 percentage points more likely to report zero edu-
cational spending than at-least-one-boy households. This large and statistically
very significant difference indicates an important correlation between the gen-
der composition of the household child population and the household’s decision
to incur positive educational spending.
Table 2 shows that, in the 10–14 and 15–19 age groups, girls have a
significantly and substantially lower current enrollment rate (than boys), that
is, a higher probability of reporting zero educational spending due to nonen-
rollment, in nearly all of the 16 sample states (exceptions are Kerala and West
Bengal). However, this is not so in the 5–9 age group, where the gender gap
in enrollment rate is significant only in about half the states. Using PROBE
(Public Report on Basic Education) data, Dre`ze and Kingdon (2001) find that,
in the 5–12 age group in northern India, boys are 13.6 percentage points
more likely to be currently enrolled than girls, which is similar to the implied
raw gender difference in table 2 in the 5–14 age group.
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TABLE 3
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON ENROLLED CHILDREN BY AGE GROUP AND GENDER
State
Ages 5–9 Ages 10–14 Ages 15–19
Female Male Gap Female Male Gap Female Male Gap
Andhra 258 219 1.0 305 330 .5 864 885 .1
Bihar 249 309 2.1* 378 431 1.4 651 652 .0
Gujarat 258 247 .3 313 350 1.0 912 1171 1.5
Haryana 633 634 .0 721 859 2.3* 1,115 1,434 2.6*
Himachal 671 707 .6 974 1,049 1.2 1,686 1,966 1.9
Karnatak 285 337 1.3 446 455 .2 751 918 1.8
Kerala 490 611 2.7* 677 745 1.3 1,269 1,373 .8
Maharashtra 210 222 1.1 359 397 1.7 688 786 1.7
Madhya 218 242 1.6 301 289 .7 651 582 1.1
Orissa 222 188 1.6 295 289 .3 852 831 .2
Punjab 498 651 2.3* 674 793 2.0* 1,712 1,365 2.0*
Rajasthan 324 348 1.0 496 520 .8 1,109 1,164 .4
Tamilnadu 333 331 .0 386 418 .6 1069 910 .8
Uttar 343 316 1.0 375 411 1.8 710 780 1.0
West Bengal 200 204 .1 382 379 .1 863 945 .8
Assam 357 353 .1 352 449 2.2* 905 1,007 .6
All India 331 345 1.5 455 477 2.2* 981 994 .4
Note. Expenditure is measured in rupees.
* Gender gap is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 3 shows average educational expenditure, conditional on enrollment.
It is clear that, once enrolled in school, girls and boys are not treated differently
in terms of educational spending in most states in any of the three age groups.
Thus, the main form of differential treatment is via the differential current
enrollment rates of girls and boys. Table 4 includes zero education-expenditure
(i.e., nonenrolled) children, and it shows that, in the 5–9 age group, the states
with the greatest gender gap in unconditional educational expenditure are
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.10 In the 10–14
age group, the gender difference in unconditional education expenditure is
significant in 12 of the 16 states, and in the 15–19 age group it is so in 14
of the 16 states. Thus, there is fairly strong evidence of gender bias in the
raw data, and the bias is stronger in the older age groups. The gender gap in
educational expenditure occurs mainly via girls’ significantly higher probability
of nonenrollment (i.e., via zero education expenditures) and only rarely via
lower expenditures once enrolled.
10 While Kerala appears to have a significant gender gap in the 5–9 age range, this seems im-
plausible. Moreover, this gap becomes insignificant after controlling for household characteristics,
as will be demonstrated later.
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TABLE 4
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON ALL (ENROLLED AND NONENROLLED) CHILDREN
BY AGE GROUP AND GENDER
State
Ages 5–9 Ages 10–14 Ages 15–19
Female Male Gap Female Male Gap Female Male Gap
Andhra 168 168 .0 174 232 1.7 130 355 4.9*
Bihar 88 142 4.1* 191 275 3.4* 153 302 5.0*
Gujarat 147 160 .5 212 288 2.6* 215 514 4.6*
Haryana 348 378 .9 503 731 4.5* 236 703 8.7*
Himachal 528 586 1.2 872 989 2.0* 780 1,458 6.3*
Karnatak 171 218 1.8 284 339 1.7 199 406 5.2*
Kerala 399 520 2.9* 662 718 1.1 679 758 .9
Maharashtra 144 154 1.2 254 339 4.6* 180 438 8.4*
Madhya 86 113 3.5* 156 200 4.0* 99 247 8.6*
Orissa 112 109 .3 165 219 3.1* 155 351 5.0*
Punjab 352 491 2.7* 495 660 3.2* 449 611 2.2*
Rajasthan 104 202 7.6* 176 410 11.4* 95 540 9.8*
Tamilnadu 204 244 1.0 259 336 1.9 248 348 1.4
Uttar 137 176 2.9* 182 297 8.6* 136 368 9.4*
West Bengal 95 99 .3 235 249 .6 212 376 3.8*
Assam 186 210 .9 271 387 3.0* 444 593 1.5
All India 170 206 6.6* 274 364 12.1* 234 468 19.5*
* Gender gap is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
B. Is Incorrect Functional Form the Reason for the Engel Curve Method’s Failure to
Detect Gender Bias?
The conventional Engel curve equation is fitted using least squares regression
on the absolute value of the household’s unconditional budget share of education.
Thus, the functional form used for the dependent variable is linear, and the
analysis models both zero and positive education budget shares in a single
equation. As stated earlier, this is problematic. We unpack the unconditional
education budget share into its two components: the probability of positive
budget share and, conditional on positive budget share, the size of budget share.
Using household-level data, we estimate three equations for each of the 16 states:
(a) the conventional Engel curve equation; (b) a binary probit of whether the
household’s education budget share is positive or zero; and (c) the OLS of the
natural log of education budget share, conditional on positive education budget
share. The resulting 48 equations are presented in table A1 in the appendix.
The first column under each state presents the conventional Engel curve of
education expenditure share (or ESHARE) fitted on all zero and positive ed-
ucation expenditure households. This is the unconditional OLS of ESHARE.
The budget share of education varies from 2.7% in Andhra Pradesh to 8.7%
in Himachal Pradesh. The goodness of fit of the conventional Engel curves
varies substantially by state. The shape of the education Engel curve was
nonlinear in several states when I allowed for a quadratic term in expenditure,
confirming that, at low levels of log of per capita expenditure (LNPCE),
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education is a luxury but that it becomes a necessity at higher levels of
expenditure.
Note that LNPCE has a significant positive relationship with budget share
of education and that the total expenditure elasticity is close to or above unity
in all states. This suggests that education is treated as a luxury. The elasticities
are mostly lower than those found in Subramanian and Deaton (1990) and
Subramanian (1995), suggesting that education has come to be treated as less
of a luxury than in the mid-1980s (the date of data in previous studies).11
Since parents with higher educational aspirations for their children’s may
work harder to generate income, education budget share and household per
capita expenditure may be jointly determined. To allow for this potential en-
dogeneity of LNPCE, acres of land owned, its square, and household’s nonearned
income (from rent, interest, and dividends) were used as instruments for house-
hold per capita expenditure.12 However, the Hausman-Wu test failed to reject
exogeneity of LNPCE in the majority of states, and IV estimates were typically
not much different from the OLS results.13 In no state and age group did the
coefficients of the age-gender variables change significantly from the OLS spec-
ification, and P-values of the F-tests (that the coefficients on male and female
variables were equal) changed little, never altering a result from statistical in-
significance to significance or vice versa. This suggests that endogeneity of per
capita expenditure is not driving the results.
The coefficient on household size is positive and significant in every state.14
11 In Subramanian’s study, the total expenditure elasticities for Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Mahar-
ashtra, Punjab, and Rajasthan were 2.14, 1.13, 1.79, 1.58, and 1.75, respectively. When we repeat
our analysis to resemble Subramanian’s, i.e., this time including households without children of
school-going age, our estimated elasticities for the five states are 1.49, 1.41, 1.19, 1.17, and 1.08,
respectively. That is, except for Haryana, the elasticities for the other four states are very considerably
lower than in Subramanian (1995).
12 Land is an illiquid asset and unlikely to be sold in response to short-term requirements such
as schooling costs (land transactions are infrequent in rural India). Similarly, rental income (generated
from illiquid assets such as property) is unlikely to change in the short run. A Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions showed that the instruments were accepted as valid in 12 out of the
16 states.
13 A Hausman-Wu endogeneity test showed that LNPCE was accepted as exogenous in 11 of the
16 states, and a Hausman specification test for all coefficients (not just LNPCE coefficient) showed
that OLS is a consistent estimator in the majority of (i.e., in 11) states.
14 This is in line with theoretical considerations that suggest that, at any given level of per capita
resources, larger households will be better off due to economies of scale that accrue from shared
household public goods. The evidence of scale economies here is of interest given its usual elusiveness
(Deaton and Paxson 1998). However, as mentioned in the methodology section, household size is
potentially endogenous, since couples with a higher taste for schooling may choose to have both
smaller families and higher education budget share. As we do not have data on households at two
or more points in time, we cannot introduce household fixed effects to address the endogeneity of
household size here. However, Sec. IV.D reports results of individual-level education expenditure
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Household head’s schooling (HEDYRS) increases the budget share of education
very significantly across all sample states, indicating a higher “taste”/demand
for child schooling among more educated households. The effects of caste and
occupation are generally not significant or consistent across states. However,
religion matters. Even after controls for household per capita expenditure and
head’s education, Muslim households have significantly lower education budget
shares than Hindus and Sikhs (the omitted category) in Andhra Pradesh,
Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Assam.
The parameters of the gender- and age-composition variables (M5to9, F5to9,
M10to14, etc.) show that education budget share generally increases with
proportion of male and female children of school-going age within the
household.
What does the fitted conventional Engel curve in each state tell us about
gender bias in the within-household allocation of educational expenditure?
The P-values of the F-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the
male and female demographic variables are equal are presented in the last
three rows of table A1. The row for the P-value for age 5–9 of the first columns
under each state shows that, in the 5–9 age group, the hypothesis that the
coefficient on M5to9 (the male demographic variable for the 5–9 age group)
is the same as the coefficient on F5to9 (the female demographic variable for
the 5–9 age group) is rejected at the 5% significance level only for Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. This lack of evidence of significant
gender bias in all but three states shows that the conventional Engel curve
technique is not good at picking up gender-differentiated treatment in edu-
cational expenditure within households, given that enrollment data show sig-
nificant gender differences in nine out of the 16 states in the 5–9 age group
(table 2).
Next, in attempting to examine why the Engel curve method fails to detect
gender bias, I unpack total household education budget share into its two
underlying components, using the hurdle model outlined earlier. The second
and third columns under each state in table A1 present equations, respectively,
for (a) the probability that the household budget share of education is positive
(the probit equation of ANYEDEXP) and (b) the natural log of education
budget share, conditional on positive spending (the conditional OLS equation).
In the conditional budget share equation, sample selection could be a problem.
equations and confirms that the findings of gender bias survive the introduction of household fixed
effects.
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The likely direction of selectivity bias was discussed in the methodology
section.15
In table A1, it is conspicuous in the second and third columns under each
state that some variables have opposing effects on the two outcomes. For
example, the effect of log of household per capita expenditure (LNPCE) is
invariably positive and highly significant in the probit of ANYEDEXP in all
states, but it is invariably negative and often highly significant in the con-
ditional OLS of budget share. As per Engel’s law, this is as expected. While
the household size variable (LNHHSIZE) has a large positive and significant
effect on the probability of spending a positive sum on education, its effect
on the conditional budget share is small and typically insignificant.16
Of most interest, from the point of view of the central question about gender
bias, is the impact on the two outcomes of the demographic variables M5to9
and F5to9 (household’s proportion of males and females aged 5–9), M10to14
and F10to14 (proportion of males and females aged 10–14), and M15to19
and F15to19 (proportion of males and females aged 15–19). To investigate
this impact, we compute the marginal effects of the male and female demo-
graphic variables in each equation and then take the difference between the
male and female marginal effects. For example, in any given equation, the
marginal effect of the variable M5to9 minus the marginal effect of the variable
F5to9 is the difference in marginal effect (DME) of the gender variables in
the 5–9 age group.
Table 5 presents the difference in marginal effects (DME) of the demographic
variables for the 5–9, 10–14, and 15–19 age groups, respectively, calculated
from the results in table A1. The figures in parentheses below each DME are
the P-values of the F-test that the DME is equal to zero. The P-values of
statistically significant DMEs (at the 5% level or better) are identified with an
asterisk. The meaning of the DME is best illustrated with an example. For
instance, in the probit of ANYEDEXP in Bihar in table A1, the marginal effect
of the variable M5to9 was 0.6408 and the marginal effect of F5to9 was 0.4437.
15 As suggested by a referee, we controlled for sample selectivity by using caste and religion
variables as identifying exclusion restrictions. We used these where it was empirically justifiable,
i.e., in states where caste and/or religion mattered to the choice of positive versus zero education
expenditure but did not matter to the conditional education expenditure. However, even in the
few cases where the selectivity term was statistically significant, the correction did not change any
of our inferences: the results of the F-tests (in the conditional LNESHARE column under each
state) in the last three rows of table A1 never changed from significant to insignificant or vice
versa in these states.
16 The marginal effects of the demographic variables are sometimes above one because these variables
take values from zero to one rather than from one to 100. Redefining them to be bounded by one
and 100 simply leads to the reported marginal effects being divided by 100.
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.019 on June 07, 2017 04:35:31 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
428
TABLE 5
DIFFERENCE IN MARGINAL EFFECT (DME) # 100 OF GENDER VARIABLES BY AGE GROUP AND P-VALUES OF THE ASSOCIATED T-TESTS (HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL RESULTS)
State
Males Ages 5–9 and Females Ages 5–9 Males Ages 10–14 and Females Ages 10–14 Males Ages 15–19 and Females Ages 15–19
Probit
(1)
Conditional
OLS
(2)
Combined
Probit
 OLS
(3) p f(1, 2)
Unconditional
OLS
(Conventional
Engel Curve)
(4)
Probit
(1)
Conditional
OLS
(2)
Combined Probit
 OLS p f
(3) p f(1, 2)
Unconditional
OLS
(Conventional
Engel Curve)
(4)
Probit
(1)
Conditional
OLS
(2)
Combined Probit
 OLS p f
(3) p f(1, 2)
Unconditional
OLS
(Conventional
Engel Curve)
(4)
AP 66.23 .17 2.31 .48 35.28 1.22 2.17 2.36 73.52 1.16 3.53 2.99
(.00)* (.90) (.05)* (.70) (.06) (.38) (.06) (.07) (.00)* (.55) (.05)* (.03)*
BIH 19.71 .51 .65 .56 46.00 2.24 .86 .52 80.52 .18 3.86 4.21
(.24) (.76) (.64) (.65) (.01)* (.17) (.54) (.69) (.00)* (.94) (.04)* (.01)*
GUJ 48.30 .14 1.47 .43 65.55 3.69 .69 .98 39.06 4.01 4.35 4.56
(.04)* (.93) (.35) (.79) (.01)* (.01)* (.63) (.55) (.09) (.02)* (.00)* (.01)*
HAR 24.07 2.63 4.04 3.54 21.01 .47 1.96 1.58 39.13 3.28 5.71 5.97
(.11) (.25) (.09) (.08) (.22) (.82) (.37) (.43) (.01)* (.25) (.03)* (.01)*
HIM 13.65 2.97 1.66 .55 12.93 .43 .70 .47 19.17 8.82 10.08 10.86
(.29) (.27) (.58) (.83) (.31) (.86) (.78) (.84) (.02)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)*
KAR 3.47 .80 .82 .13 23.73 .80 1.80 1.48 38.72 3.81 4.97 5.89
(.80) (.59) (.56) (.93) (.09) (.57) (.15) (.29) (.01)* (.03)* (.00)* (.00)*
KER 6.36 1.29 2.02 1.59 8.98 1.41 2.45 1.08 .86 1.99 1.80 .00
(.33) (.57) (.48) (.50) (.45) (.51) (N.A.) (.63) (.88) (.41) (.52) (.99)
MAH 16.39 1.34 .07 .89 52.03 .68 2.62 1.18 79.64 2.16 6.59 7.27
(.26) (.37) (.96) (.50) (.00)* (.63) (.09) (.36) (.00)* (.20) (.00)* (.00)*
MP 27.59 .05 1.05 1.66 65.66 .54 2.80 .82 88.06 4.58 6.55 5.00
(.02)* (.96) (.18) (.03)* (.00)* (.57) (.00)* (.31) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)*
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ORI 77.58 2.00 1.46 .26 72.55 .15 2.82 .55 70.45 5.43 6.53 4.99
(.00)* (.11) (.31) (.83) (.00)* (.91) (.04)* (.69) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)*
PUN 38.36 3.27 4.89 2.98 9.99 1.99 2.22 2.81 22.70 3.63 4.29 2.48
(.06) (.33) (.08) (.18) (.66) (.55) (.47) (.22) (.22) (.33) (.12) (.26)
RAJ 55.88 2.09 3.88 4.02 130.48 3.64 8.12 6.54 105.99 7.72 10.15 8.82
(.00)* (.10) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)*
TN 52.10 .44 2.68 2.55 43.35 1.61 3.21 2.23 17.23 5.04 4.76 1.67
(.02)* (.83) (.15) (.17) (.09) (.44) (.12) (.26) (.44) (.05)* (.06) (.39)
UP 45.77 .26 2.35 2.30 78.53 .40 3.41 1.26 59.92 6.70 7.77 7.21
(.00)* (.82) (.01)* (.01)* (.00)* (.72) (.00)* (.19) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)*
WB 16.01 1.77 .59 .13 6.14 .70 .24 1.17 34.73 3.74 3.73 2.02
(.41) (.29) (.67) (.92) (.78) (.67) (.86) (.44) (.18) (.08) (.04)* (.24)
ASS 3.82 .96 .69 .67 18.93 1.30 1.81 1.97 16.08 3.59 2.42 3.95
(.84) (.55) (.67) (.67) (.55) (.51) (.34) (.35) (.59) (.17) (.38) (.11)
Note. In the conditional OLS equation ﬁtted only for households with positive education spending, the dependent variable is the natural log of the household education budget share. Thus, the
coefﬁcients of the gender dummy variables were transformed so that the marginal effects reported in col. 2 are comparable to those in col. 4, where the dependent variable is in absolute rather than
log terms. Col. 4 pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute household education budget share, ﬁtted on all households, including those with zero education budget shares. The table displays 100
times the difference in marginal effects (DME) of the variables “proportion of males aged 5–9” and “proportion of females aged 5–9,” etc. The ﬁgures in parentheses are P-values of the t-test of the
DME, where standard errors for the t-test in each cell of col. 3 were obtained by bootstrapping with 500 replications.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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Thus the gender DME in the 5–9 age group was 0.1971. Table 5 shows this
difference multiplied by 100, that is, as 19.71. The P-value of the F-test that
this difference is equal to zero was 0.24, that is, this gender difference in marginal
effect is statistically insignificant. In table 5, the probit results in column 1 refer
to male-female DME from the probit of whether the household had a positive
education budget share. Column 2 refers to the male-female DME in the con-
ditional OLS of the log of education budget share (LNESHARE). Since the
dependent variable here is in logs, the marginal effects of the male and female
demographic variables were transformed before taking differences, so that the
DMEs reported in column 2 are comparable to those in column 4, where the
dependent variable was absolute ESHARE.17 Column 3 shows the DME of the
combined marginal effects from the probit and conditional OLS equations, the
combined marginal effect having been derived in the way shown in equation
(7). Column 4 pertains to the unconditional OLS results, that is, the OLS of
the absolute budget share of education fitted on all (including zero education
expenditure) households—the commonly reported Engel curve equation.
Table 5 demonstrates two interesting facts. First, the DME is almost
always positive in the probit. That is, in most cases, having an extra boy
in the household has a greater positive impact on the probability of having
ANYEDEXP than having an extra girl in the household. Second, the gender
DME is often negative in the conditional OLS in the 5–9 and 10–14 age
groups (though not in the 15–19 group). Thus, in the basic education age
group (ages 5–14), in many states, there is slight pro-female bias in con-
ditional education budget share: having an extra girl in the household
increases the conditional household budget share of education more than
having an extra boy in the household. This could be because certain costs
of girls’ education are somewhat greater than those for boys.18
17 For example, the coefficient on the variable M5to9 in the conditional OLS of LNESHARE for
Gujarat is 0.87 and the coefficient on F5to9 is 0.83. The log transforms of these are obtained
by using the property of the log normal distribution that the conditional expectation of
equals . For the Gujarat conditional log expenditure equation, exp(.) is2E(sFx, s 1 0) exp (xb j /2)
equal to 0.03458. Thus the marginal effect of M5to9 is , i.e., it isb# exp (.) 0.87#
; the marginal effect of F5to9 is . The gender0.03458p0.0301 0.83# 0.03458p0.0287
difference in marginal effect for the 5–9 age group in Gujarat in the conditional OLS of budget
share (as opposed to the log of budget share) is thus . In table(0.0301) (0.0287)p0.0014
5, all (differences in) marginal effects are multiplied by 100, so this appears as 0.14.
18 For instance, girls’ school clothes may cost more since girls should be well covered. However,
there is no consistent evidence of systematically greater expenditure on girls than boys in particular
education expenditure categories. In the questionnaire, tuition fee and school uniform are lumped
together in one category, so we cannot check if more is spent on a girl’s school uniform than a
boy’s. In the 5–9, 10–14, and 15–19 age groups, mean transport costs are higher for girls than
boys in only three, five, and six of the 16 states, respectively.
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In the 5–9 age group of table 5, the gender DME in the probit is positive
for all states except two (Karnataka and Assam) and is statistically significant
in seven states. In eight out of the 16 states, the gender DME in the conditional
OLS of LNESHARE is negative (albeit insignificant), and in no state is there
significant pro-male gender bias in conditional education expenditure. The
inference from the “conventional” Engel curve results, presented in column 4,
is that there is no significant gender bias in education expenditure in the 5–9
age group in any state other than Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar
Pradesh. However, such an inference masks the fact that, in four states other
than these, there is significant gender bias in the decision whether to enroll
a child in school. To overlook the difference is to miss an important discrim-
inatory process.
In the 10–14 age group of table 5, the gender DME in the probit is positive
for all states except Kerala and West Bengal, and it is significant in seven
states. But the DME from the conditional OLS is insignificant in all but two
states. The conventional Engel curve result in column 4 would lead to the
inference of no significant gender bias in any state other than Rajasthan. As
in the 5–9 age group, such an inference would neglect the fact that in six
states other than Rajasthan, there is significant bias in the enrollment decision.
Age 10–14 results of table 5 also show that, using the hurdle model approach
(col. 3), four states have significant gender bias in unconditional education
expenditure. In other words, when the decision to incur positive education
expenditure is modeled separately from the decision of how much to spend
conditional on positive expenditure (using appropriate functional forms), we
are more successful in “picking up” gender bias in education spending than
with the conventional Engel approach that imposes linear regression of un-
conditional education expenditure.
In the 15–19 age group, both the DME in the probit and the DME in
the conditional OLS are typically positive (significant only in 10 states in
the probit and in eight states in the conditional OLS). Thus, unlike in the
case of the 5–9 and 10–14 age groups, here both the probit and conditional
OLS results mostly work in the same direction, that is, they reinforce each
other.
It is not clear what explains the lack of significant gender difference in
conditional education expenditure in the primary and junior high school age
groups but its presence in the secondary school age group. One possibility
might be that gender-differentiated treatment in conditional education ex-
penditure only begins at the secondary school stage because at that stage
children are closer to further education courses and to employment. However,
at the secondary school stage, there may be supply-side reasons for not inter-
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preting lower conditional educational expenditure on girls necessarily as evi-
dence of parental discrimination. By the early 1990s, state-provided elementary
education was tuition free for both genders, but this was not so for secondary
education. However, certain states operated an affirmative action policy for
girls at the secondary school stage by providing tuition-free secondary schooling
to girls.19 Thus, in these states, lower conditional education expenditure on
girls cannot be taken as evidence of parental bias against girls. Moreover, the
dearth of (and distance to) single-sex girls’ secondary schools may deter parents
from sending girls to school for safety and social reasons, rather than for reasons
of discrimination; thus it is difficult to know what part of girls’ observed
inferior enrollment outcomes in the ages 15–19 range is due to parental
discrimination and what is due to supply-side factors.
To sum up, the discussion so far suggests two conclusions. First, the Engel
curve approach does not pick up gender bias partly because it uses the wrong
functional form. It estimates a single budget share equation to encompass two
different decisions: the binary decision of whether to make a purchase and the
decision, conditional on purchase, of how much to spend on the good. If the
correct functional form for the binary decision is nonlinear and the correct
distribution of conditional expenditure is log normal rather than normal, then
a hurdle model seems better able to capture gender biases in unconditional
expenditure. Second, the discussion shows the importance of “unpacking” the
total gender difference in expenditure into its two constituent parts—the
difference due to a greater incidence of zero purchases for girls than boys and
the difference due to lower conditional expenditures on girls than boys—so
as to avoid lumping together two different (often divergent) processes. Av-
eraging over the two dilutes the effect of the former difference, which is clearly
the main discriminatory process. While averaging may lead to the conclusion
of no pro-male bias, there is evidence of significant pro-male bias in one of
the processes, and policy makers may be as concerned with the distribution
of educational expenditure for girls and boys as with its average. Indeed, it is
possible that, for children’s long-term life chances, being in school is more
important than expenditure on schooling once enrolled.
C. Is Aggregation the Reason for the Engel Curve Method’s Failure to Detect
Gender Bias?
We turn next to examine whether aggregation of data at the household level
makes it more difficult to detect gender differences in educational expenditure
19 Bihar, Haryana, Himachal, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Assam provided free access to
secondary education for girls.
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than when using individual child-level data. Individual-level expenditure pro-
vides the most reliable way of detecting gender bias. As we have educational
expenditure information at the level of the individual child and also, by ag-
gregation, at the level of the household, it is possible to compare household-
level Engel curve results with individual-level analysis. In the individual-level
analysis, the dependent variable is education expenditure on the individual
child (rather than household budget share of education). Moreover, instead of
demographic variables such as household proportion of males aged 5–9 and
household proportion of females aged 5–9, and so forth, the gender variable
of interest is simply the dummy variable MALE, which is one for males and
zero for females. The remainder of the explanatory variables in the individual-
level equations are identical to those in the household equations of table A1,
that is, they are household-level variables. The three age groups of interest,
as before, are ages 5–9, ages 10–14, and ages 15–19, corresponding roughly
with primary, junior high, and secondary education.
At the individual child level, we estimated 144 separate equations (16 states
# 3 age groups # 3 equations). We do not display all 144 equations, but
the marginal effects on the gender variable MALE from these equations are
presented in table 6 for the three age groups.
The marginal effects on MALE in table 6 are not comparable with the
difference in marginal effects of the household demographic variables in table
5. This is because the household demographic variables in a household-level
regression are not identical to the dummy variable MALE in the individual-
level regression. It is also because the dependent variable in the conditional
and unconditional OLS equations in table 6 is education expenditure on the
individual child but in table 5 the corresponding dependent variable is house-
hold education budget share. Thus, the scaling of the coefficients and marginal
effects will be different in the two tables. However, we are interested mainly
in whether any statistically significant gender differences in the individual-
level table 6 are also significant in the household-level table 5.
The individual-level results of table 6 confirm what we saw earlier, namely,
that, in each of the three age groups, much of the gender-differentiated treat-
ment occurs at the stage of the decision whether to even incur positive education
expenditure (enroll a child in school) and not in the decision of how much to
spend, conditional on school enrollment. In some instances, the marginal effect
of MALE in the conditional expenditure equation is negative, that is, girls
have somewhat higher education expenditure, conditional on being in school,
though this pro-female bias is never statistically significant.
Since MALE is a discrete variable, the marginal effect of MALE in the
combined hurdle model (col. 3) is estimated by calculating the expected values
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TABLE 6
MARGINAL EFFECT OF THE GENDER DUMMY VARIABLE MALE AND P-VALUE OF THE ASSOCIATED T-TEST (INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA FOR THE THREE AGE GROUPS)
State
Ages 5–9 Ages 10–14 Ages 15–19
Probit
(1)
Conditional
OLS
(2)
Combined
Probit
 OLS
(3) p f(1, 2)
Unconditional
OLS
(4)
Probit
(1)
Conditional
OLS
(2)
Combined
Probit
 OLS
(3) p f(1, 2)
Unconditional
OLS
(4)
Probit
(1)
Conditional
OLS
(2)
Combined
Probit
 OLS
(3) p f(1, 2)
Unconditional
OLS
(4)
AP .148 9.8 29.5 31.4 .214 13.0 49.7 61.0 .345 56.6 198.3 177.9
(.00)* (.30) (.00)* (.05)* (.00)* (.34) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.44) (.00)* (.00)*
BIH .126 15.9 33.8 38.3 .237 16.1 78.6 74.7 .337 23.2 140.5 122.0
(.00)* (.24) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.28) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.51) (.00)* (.00)*
GUJ .045 1.6 7.1 1.5 .200 2.6 7.4 36.0 .252 212.2 203.6 203.0
(.24) (.86) (.29) (.93) (.00)* (.82) (.21) (.08) (.00)* (.01)* (.00)* (.00)*
HAR .061 64.3 66.1 57.3 .210 68.3 177.3 165.7 .337 314.7 454.2 426.4
(.04)* (.02)* (.00)* (.02)* (.00)* (.02)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)*
HIM .052 30.5 34.1 40.0 .123 59.4 152.5 96.3 .340 149.8 588.5 548.5
(.15) (.26) (.12) (.28) (.00)* (.11) (.00)* (.06) (.00)* (.05)* (.00)* (.00)*
KAR .060 10.0 18.3 23.4 .160 13.0 40.5 44.3 .206 32.4 148.6 141.2
(.02)* (.36) (.04)* (.15) (.00)* (.31) (.00)* (.01)* (.00)* (.50) (.00)* (.00)*
KER .008 19.6 19.3 45.5 .116 17.5 92.2 40.8 .049 41.7 27.7 5.7
(.84) (.41) (.21) (.24) (.01) (.44) (.15) (.19) (.33) (.50) (.82) (.92)
MAH .001 1.7 1.2 5.3 .176 10.9 75.4 53.7 .391 59.9 207.3 210.0
(.97) (.87) (.86) (.53) (.00)* (.31) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.15) (.00)* (.00)*
MP .090 13.4 19.7 25.9 .255 23.8 67.6 46.3 .369 44.0 178.3 145.4
(.00)* (.04)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.18) (.00)* (.00)*
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ORI .062 16.7 .95 9.4 .283 2.9 64.8 45.7 .303 49.9 143.9 162.5
(.05)* (.07) (.31) (.46) (.00)* (.79) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.29) (.00)* (.00)*
PUN .095 100.3 114.6 105.1 .104 66.5 115.5 114.8 .287 51.7 345.3 264.8
(.01)* (.04)* (.01)* (.03)* (.01)* (.15) (.00)* (.02)* (.00)* (.62) (.00)* (.00)*
RAJ .305 31.6 94.5 87.5 .617 60.5 289.6 243.8 .425 57.3 240.7 390.6
(.00)* (.02)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.61) (.00)* (.00)*
TN .156 11.8 40.8 16.1 .183 18.5 66.4 56.0 .200 43.6 100.0 62.9
(.00)* (.52) (.10) (.61) (.00)* (.38) (.05)* (.08) (.00)* (.59) (.30) (.16)
UP .196 5.7 50.5 41.8 .341 32.7 132.6 111.8 .358 86.0 223.7 234.2
(.00)* (.60) (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.00)* (.02)* (.00)* (.00)*
WB .012 3.6 .12 1.2 .064 30.3 37.6 26.8 .160 11.6 88.9 154.6
(.71) (.75) (.68) (.93) (.07) (.11) (.02)* (.16) (.00)* (.84) (.00)* (.00)*
ASS .076 .44 17.1 10.4 .096 9.9 27.5 6.9 .185 75.2 152.2 105.9
(.04)* (.97) (.10) (.62) (.12) (.59) (.87) (.77) (.01)* (.29) (.09) (.12)
Note. In the conditional OLS equation ﬁtted only for children with positive education spending, the dependent variable is the natural log of education expenditure. Thus,
the coefﬁcients of the gender dummy variables were transformed so that the marginal effects reported in col. 2 are comparable to those in col. 4, where the dependent
variable is in absolute rather than log terms. Col. 4 pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute education expenditure, ﬁtted on all children, including those with zero
education expenditure. The table shows the marginal effect on the gender dummy variable MALE. The ﬁgures in parentheses are P-values of the t-test of the marginal effect
of MALE, where standard errors for the t-test in each cell of col. 3 are obtained by bootstrapping with 500 replications.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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of unconditional expenditure in equation (5) with MALEp1 and with
MALEp0 and then taking the difference, rather than by taking derivatives,
as in equation (7).20 Column 4 presents the marginal effect of the variable
MALE in the unconditional expenditure equation, that is, the single OLS
equation estimated including zero education expenditures.
While a comparison of columns 3 and 4 shows quite good correspondence
between the two, the hurdle model is still more effective at picking up gender
bias than the conventional unconditional OLS model. For example, in table 6,
for the 5–9 age group, the hurdle model detects overall gender bias in Karnataka
where the unconditional OLS fails to pick it up. The same is true for Himachal,
Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal for the 10–14 age group in table 6.
The most noteworthy fact to emerge from a comparison of tables 5 and 6
is that the gender difference in education expenditure is statistically significant
in many more states when individual-level data are used (table 6) than when
household aggregated data are used (table 5). This may be taken to suggest
that there is something in the aggregation that makes it more difficult to pick
up gender differences in expenditure.
D. Is There Gender Inequality in Education Expenditure without There Being
Gender Bias?
Jensen (2002) suggests that gender inequality in outcomes (such as education
expenditure) could arise even in the absence of any parental bias against daugh-
ters. If parents’ fertility behavior displays differential stopping rules after the
birth of sons and daughters, then, even if parents treat all children equally,
girls will have worse outcomes in the population as a whole simply because
of across-household differences in household size, that is, because girls have
more siblings and thus live in larger households.21 If this is true, the substantial
male-female differences in education expenditure observed so far may not
represent parental bias per se. Since household size—an outcome of parental
preferences—is endogenous in this situation, controlling for household size (as
we have done so far) will not control adequately for this effect. However, the
inclusion of family fixed effects in education outcome equations provides a
powerful control for household unobserved factors such as parental preferences.
20 However, when we estimated the marginal effects of the continuous gender variables M5to9
and F5to9, etc., in the Engel curve equation, using household-level data earlier in this article, we
used derivatives as set out in eqq. (6) and (7).
21 Households where early births were male offspring will have smaller household size and be
better-off economically, implying higher expenditures on children of both sexes. Households in
which early births were female children continue childbearing until a boy (or desired number of
boys) is born. Such households will be larger due to there being more girls.
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Table 7 presents the coefficients and t-values of the gender dummy variable
MALE in three individual-level equations for each age group: (i) the probit
equation of ANYEDEXP (whether any positive expenditure was incurred on
a child’s education), (ii) the equation of the natural log of education expenditure
(LNEDEXP) conditional on positive education expenditure, and (iii) the equa-
tion of the unconditional education expenditure (EETOTAL). The equations
were fitted on the subset of households that had at least one child of each
gender in the relevant age group. Table 7 shows significant within-household
gender difference in education expenditures in the 5–9, 10–14, and 15–19
age groups in most of the states where there are significant gender differences
in the raw descriptive statistics of tables 2–4. Thus, most of the observed
gender differences can indeed be interpreted as differential treatment of sons
and daughters by parents within the home, rather than as arising from across
household differences in household size.
V. Conclusion
The individual-level data on educational expenditures confirm that (i) in Indian
states with the most skewed sex ratios, educational outcomes, such as school
enrollment rates for girls, are significantly worse than those for boys and that
(ii) in those Indian states where there is evidence of significantly worse educational
outcomes for girls than boys, household expenditure on girls’ education is indeed
significantly lower than that on boys’, that is, lower educational inputs are an
important mechanism by which girls’ educational outcomes turn out to be
inferior than boys’. The data show that the most important way in which gender
bias in educational resource allocation manifests itself in rural Indian households
is via nonenrollment of girls, which implies zero educational spending. There
is little gender bias in educational expenditure among enrolled children.
The existing explanations for why the household expenditure methodology
fails to find gender bias include the suggestion that there may not, in fact,
be any within-household bias against girls in education expenditure, as dis-
cussed earlier (Rose 1999; Jensen 2002). However, since individual-level data
and household fixed-effects estimations here show pervasive within-household
gender differences in education expenditure in rural India, this article has
sought to test alternative potential explanations for the Engel curve method’s
inability to detect bias in intrahousehold allocation.
The analysis here shows a low degree of correspondence between results in
individual-level and household-level data. Particularly in the 5–9 and 10–14
age groups, the household expenditure method fails to find significant discrim-
ination. Tests suggest that the failure is partly because the Engel curve method
as conventionally applied suffers from an incorrect functional form and the
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TABLE 7
COEFFICIENT OF THE MALE DUMMY IN INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL EQUATIONS WITH FAMILY FIXED EFFECTS
State
Ages 5–9 Ages 10–14 Ages 15–19
ANYEDEXP LNEDEXP EETOTAL ANYEDEXP LNEDEXP EETOTAL ANYEDEXP LNEDEXP EETOTAL
Andhra .048 .091 .2 .165 .080 46.0 .184 .053 153.8
(1.4) (1.3) (.0) (4.3)* (.9) (2.4)* (5.2)* (.3) (3.2)*
Bihar .102 .087 63.0 .184 .171 81.2 .257 .190 159.9
(3.9)* (1.3) (3.6)* (6.9)* (2.6)* (5.1)* (6.9)* (1.8) (5.1)*
Gujarat .074 .008 20.9 .155 .053 62.2 .163 .221 238.6
(2.0)* (.2) (1.7) (4.6)* (.7) (1.7) (4.0)* (1.2) (2.5)*
Haryana .071 .255 90.4 .154 .104 212.1 .312 .178 478.8
(2.5)* (3.5)* (3.6)* (4.7)* (2.1)* (3.8)* (8.1)* (1.0) (6.0)*
Himachal .091 .059 77.1 .065 .098 153.5 .265 .047 548.5
(2.4)* (1.0) (1.9) (2.5)* (1.9) (1.7) (5.8)* (.4) (4.4)*
Karnatak .014 .007 20.6 .114 .017 26.1 .184 .047 167.7
(.5) (.1) (1.0) (4.4)* (.3) (.9) (4.8)* (.7) (3.9)*
Kerala .003 .090 52.2 .048 .019 33.4 .062 .210 70.5
(.1) (1.2) (1.2) (1.6) (.3) (.7) (1.2) (1.5) (.9)
Maharashtra .037 .030 19.3 .115 .089 58.4 .281 .006 241.2
(1.2) (.5) (1.9) (4.3)* (2.0)* (3.5)* (6.5)* (.0) (4.2)*
Madhya .081 .138 29.7 .178 .046 56.7 .251 .061 161.6
(3.9)* (2.7)* (4.2)* (8.2)* (1.1) (6.4)* (10.4)* (.6) (7.3)*
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Orissa .001 .087 1.5 .203 .106 51.4 .139 .005 87.3
(.0) (1.1) (.1) (5.8)* (1.9) (3.3)* (3.5)* (.0) (2.4)*
Punjab .051 .122 82.2 .099 .072 69.9 .241 .055 284.1
(1.2) (1.2) (2.5)* (2.6)* (1.4) (1.5) (5.9)* (.8) (3.4)*
Rajasthan .258 .120 90.5 .524 .094 256.6 .286 .084 328.9
(9.5)* (2.3)* (4.6)* (17.3)* (1.4) (9.4)* (8.0)* (.6) (5.4)*
Tamilnadu .138 .132 34.4 .112 .077 44.8 .225 .161 212.9
(2.2)* (1.4) (.9) (2.3)* (1.1) (1.8) (4.0)* (.7) (2.8)*
Uddar .146 .065 45.6 .294 .111 135.6 .269 .139 210.6
(7.1)* (1.3) (3.0)* (13.8)* (3.0)* (10.8)* (10.5)* (1.3) (6.9)*
West Bengal .050 .030 13.2 .111 .004 13.6 .121 .045 104.9
(1.5) (.4) (.6) (3.2)* (.1) (.6) (2.7)* (.3) (2.4)*
Assam .021 .066 2.9 .030 .054 12.7 .025 .009 27.9
(.6) (1.2) (.1) (1.1) (.7) (.7) (.5) (.1) (.4)
Note. The three individual-level equations for each age group are (i) the probit equation of ANYEDEXP (whether any positive expenditure was incurred for the index child’s
education), (ii) the equation of the natural log of education expenditure (LNEDEXP) conditional on ANYEDEXP being positive, and (iii) the unconditional educationexpenditure
equation (EETOTAL). The right-hand-side variables are age and the gender dummy MALE. The equations are ﬁtted only on that subset of households that have at least one
child of each gender in the relevant age group. The average number of households per state in the ﬁxed effects estimation of EETOTAL and ANYEDEXP is 233, 203, and
153 in the 5–9, 10–14, and 15–19 age groups, respectively. In the conditional LNEDEXP equation, the average number of households per state in the ﬁxed effects estimation
in these three age groups is 173, 168, and 77, respectively. The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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limitation that the effects of the household gender composition variables on both
(a) the decision to enroll in school and (b) the decision of how much to spend—
conditional on enrolling—are constrained to be in the same direction. Our data
suggest that the effects are in divergent directions in a substantial number of
cases in the primary and junior high school age groups. However, in the 15–19
age group, these two effects work in the same direction and tend to reinforce
each other. Thus, it is only in this group that results from the Engel curve
method correspond well with the results from the direct inspection of individual-
level expenditure. Given that the two processes of discrimination often diverge,
neither the unconditional OLS nor the Tobit are appropriate modeling strategies.
The hurdle model has greater power to detect discrimination.
The results also suggest that aggregation of data at the household level
makes it more difficult to pick up gender differences. Even when individual-
and household-level variables and equations are made as similar as possible,
household-level equations consistently fail to capture the full extent of the
gender bias. This suggests that aggregation of data does prevent the household
expenditure method from detecting gender bias and that this is not due to
measurement error in the household expenditure variable. We are left with
the conclusion that, for those concerned with reliably measuring the extent
of gender discrimination in household expenditure allocation, household-level
data are a poor substitute for individual-level expenditure data. Household
expenditure data are of some use providing that one models the hurdle, but
it still understates the extent of the problem of gender discrimination.
The results here highlight that there are two distinct processes by which
gender bias occurs in the within-household allocation of educational expen-
diture. Thus, a method that integrates/jointly models these two processes
dilutes the powerful gender differentiation that exists in many states in the
main discriminatory mechanism, namely, the nonenrollment of girls. This
insight may be generalizable to some other goods. For instance, it is possible
that this is also the reason why no significant or consistent evidence of gender
bias has been detected in medical expenditures in India (Subramanian and
Deaton 1990; Subramanian 1995). It is fairly plausible to imagine scenarios
whereby parents delay seeking medical care for girls as compared with boys
in the same state of illness but, conditional on seeking medical advice, the
expenditure on girls is the same as that on boys.22 Policy makers may be as,
22 The results suggest that, where the conventional Engel method shows significant bias, this is
indicative of the existence of strong gender differences in education expenditure. The findings also
have implications for the adult good method of detecting gender bias. Any parental response to
additional boys and girls could (i) modify their purchasing behavior (e.g., whether or not they
purchase an adult good such as alcohol, cigarette, or pan) and/or (ii) modify their conditional
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or even more, concerned with the former source of bias, since it may be more
important for children’s longer-term life chances.
Our discussion also points out the need to consider the supply side when
investigating household expenditures on particular commodities. If certain
facilities and institutions (such as schools or health clinics) are not locally
available and there are social taboos or difficulties about girls’ use of nonlocal
facilities, or if there are affirmative action policies in place for girls’ health or
their participation in certain levels of education, household expenditures on
girls may be lower not due to parental discrimination per se but rather due
to these supply-side conditions.
While our data show very significantly lower educational allocations to girls
than boys in rural India, explanations underlying these differential allocations
are not explored here. Gender-differentiated treatment could be due to son
preference or due to an investment motive. The investment motive attributes
unequal allocations to the differential returns of girls and boys, or differential
returns accruing to parents. Differential returns may arise from dowry, different
labor returns of males and females, or patrilocal family structure (Rose 2000).
Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) find that, where there are economic returns to
women’s human capital, parents do invest in girls’ education. Estimates for
urban India suggest that women face lower economic returns to education
than men (Kingdon 1998).23 Further evidence on returns to men and women’s
education in the rural Indian labor market would be useful in analyzing whether
gender bias in intrahousehold educational resource allocation in rural India is
attributable to gender differentials in the returns to education.
amount expended on the adult good. That is, biased parents could adjust adult good consumption
(via either or both of the above two mechanisms) more for an additional boy than for an additional
girl. If additional children affect adult good consumption mainly via mechanism i and not via ii,
then, as here, averaging across the two mechanisms could potentially dilute the capacity of the
adult good method to detect gender bias. In any case, discovering that parents are more willing
to adjust purchasing behavior for boys than girls would be indicative of bias and thus be of interest
in its own right.
23 Indian estimates in Kingdon (1998) do not conform to the worldwide pattern (noted in Schultz
2002) that returns to women’s education are generally comparable to or higher than those to men’s.
Duraisamy (2002) and Kingdon and Unni (2001) find mixed evidence on returns to men and
women’s education in India, though neither study controlled for omitted family background bias,
which, in Kingdon (1998), substantially reduces women’s returns but not men’s.
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Appendix
TABLE A1
OLS REGRESSION OF BUDGET SHARE OF EDUCATION; BINARY PROBIT OF ANY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE; AND OLS REGRESSION OF NATURAL LOG OF BUDGET SHARE OF
EDUCATION, CONDITIONAL ON POSITIVE EDUCATION (ALL EQUATIONS WITH VILLAGE FIXED EFFECTS)
Variable
Andhra Pradesh Bihar
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE .58 1.8 .22 4.4 .39 3.8 1.15 4.1 .32 7.9 .35 4.5
LNHHSIZE 1.86 5.9 .47 9.2 .05 .5 1.65 5.0 .49 9.8 .01 .1
M0TO4 5.24 2.3 .98 3.0 1.36 1.8 2.34 .8 .58 1.5 .41 .5
M5TO9 3.36 1.5 1.58 4.7 .19 .3 3.37 1.2 .64 1.8 .31 .4
M10TO14 4.08 1.8 .81 2.5 .83 1.2 7.48 2.7 .94 2.5 1.27 1.6
M15TO19 5.52 2.4 .07 .2 2.32 3.2 7.19 2.6 .39 1.0 1.90 2.4
M20TO24 2.69 1.1 .47 1.4 .52 .6 3.88 1.3 .42 1.0 1.33 1.5
M25TO60 1.31 .6 .43 1.3 .42 .6 1.23 .4 .43 1.1 .24 .3
M61MORE 3.07 1.1 .69 1.7 .55 .6 4.47 1.2 .31 .6 .79 .7
F0TO4 4.33 1.9 .41 1.3 1.62 2.2 2.55 .9 .59 1.6 .70 .9
F5TO9 2.88 1.3 .91 2.8 .24 .3 3.93 1.4 .44 1.2 .41 .5
F10TO14 1.73 .8 .45 1.4 .50 .7 8.01 2.9 .48 1.3 1.73 2.1
F15TO19 2.53 1.1 .81 2.5 2.00 2.7 2.98 1.0 .41 1.0 1.93 2.3
F20TO24 .94 .4 .12 .3 .14 .2 .08 .0 .65 1.6 .59 .7
F25TO60 2.67 1.2 .60 1.9 .57 .8 .12 .0 .05 .1 .01 .0
HEDYRS .41 9.9 .06 8.3 .08 6.7 .36 10.2 .06 10.9 .05 5.5
SC .52 2.1 .01 .3 .22 2.8 .79 2.8 .07 1.9 .17 2.2
ST .40 .5 .03 .3 .00 .0 .37 .8 .11 1.7 .02 .2
MUSLIM .90 1.8 .00 .1 .31 2.1 .36 1.0 .11 2.3 .13 1.3
CHRISTN .03 .0 .07 .7 .27 1.2 1.34 1.0 .29 1.9 .01 .0
INTERCEPT 7.68 2.1 1.26 1.1 13.24 3.6 1.85 1.8
Adjusted 2R .2056 .3661 .3935 .2979 .3294 .3422
N 1,571 1,548 1,001 1,787 1,768 1,042
Dependent variable mean .0269 .6415 3.7624 .0346 .5865 3.2549
Expenditure elasticity 1.22 1.33
P-value:
Age 5–9 .70 .00 .90 .65 .24 .76
Age 10–14 .07 .06 .38 .69 .01 .17
Age 15–19 .03 .00 .55 .01 .00 .94
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Variable
Gujarat Haryana
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE 1.36 3.9 .18 3.8 .08 .8 2.19 4.9 .24 7.2 .07 1.0
LNHHSIZE 1.40 3.6 .51 8.2 .10 .8 2.84 6.2 .36 9.8 .06 .8
M0TO4 2.68 .9 .94 2.3 .92 1.1 6.88 2.0 .30 1.3 1.46 2.5
M5TO9 .35 .1 1.06 2.7 .87 1.1 9.06 2.7 .81 3.4 .39 .7
M10TO14 3.20 1.2 1.40 3.6 .05 .1 10.88 3.2 1.03 4.0 .97 1.7
M15TO19 4.50 1.7 .07 .2 1.87 2.5 11.36 3.4 .28 1.2 1.38 2.4
M20TO24 1.98 .7 .97 2.4 .26 .3 .37 .1 .21 .9 .39 .6
M25TO60 3.51 1.2 .16 .4 .62 .8 .12 .0 .09 .4 .20 .3
M61MORE 4.59 1.2 1.22 2.1 .48 .4 2.21 .5 .21 .6 .00 .0
F0TO4 4.34 1.6 .75 1.9 1.62 2.1 4.82 1.4 .17 .7 1.46 2.4
F5TO9 .78 .3 .58 1.5 .83 1.1 5.52 1.6 .57 2.4 .03 .1
F10TO14 4.18 1.5 .74 1.8 1.12 1.5 12.46 3.8 .82 3.5 .91 1.6
F15TO19 .06 .0 .32 .8 .71 .9 5.39 1.5 .12 .5 .93 1.6
F20TO24 2.29 .8 .91 2.1 1.23 1.3 1.95 .5 .32 1.3 .12 .2
F25TO60 .07 .0 .20 .5 .18 .2 2.57 .8 .26 1.2 .07 .1
HEDYRS .29 5.2 .05 5.7 .04 2.5 .35 6.6 .02 3.9 .05 6.1
SC .85 2.1 .05 .7 .18 1.6 .44 1.2 .07 2.5 .06 1.0
ST .25 .5 .12 1.7 .16 1.2 1.37 .6 … … .39 1.2
MUSLIM 1.03 1.6 .09 .9 .16 .8 .89 .8 .07 .9 .00 .0
CHRISTN 3.77 1.9 … … .42 .9 4.37 .7 … … … …
INTERCEPT 10.38 2.6 2.77 2.5 19.06 3.9 2.15 2.5
Adjusted 2R .3286 .4252 .4515 .2560 .3708 .2793
N 1,182 1,083 776 1,409 1,361 1,074
Dependent variable mean .0317 .6463 3.6331 .0614 .7546 2.8315
Expenditure elasticity 1.43 1.36
P-value:
Age 5–9 .79 .04 .93 .08 .11 .25
Age 10–14 .55 .01 .01 .43 .22 .82
Age 15–19 .01 .09 .02 .01 .01 .25
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Variable
Himachal Pradesh Karnataka
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE .30 .6 .07 3.0 .40 6.1 .48 1.4 .19 5.6 .29 3.9
LNHHSIZE 3.48 6.2 .15 5.8 .13 1.8 1.75 5.1 .36 10.4 .01 .1
M0TO4 11.02 3.0 .32 2.1 2.14 4.8 2.86 1.1 .38 1.7 1.48 2.6
M5TO9 5.05 1.5 .39 2.3 .04 .1 4.48 1.8 .84 3.8 .09 .2
M10TO14 13.83 4.3 .29 1.9 1.34 3.5 10.37 4.5 1.11 5.1 1.40 2.7
M15TO19 16.11 5.0 .03 .2 1.93 4.9 9.09 3.8 .24 1.1 1.95 3.7
M20TO24 4.02 1.1 .33 2.3 .07 .2 5.08 2.0 .33 1.5 1.56 2.7
M25TO60 3.59 1.1 .24 1.8 .54 1.4 1.68 .7 .25 1.1 .55 1.0
M61MORE 7.90 2.0 .25 1.4 .61 1.2 .00 .0 .27 .9 .36 .5
F0TO4 7.91 2.1 .24 1.5 1.70 3.6 3.49 1.3 .41 1.8 .92 1.6
F5TO9 4.50 1.3 .25 1.7 .30 .7 4.61 1.9 .87 3.9 .25 .5
F10TO14 13.36 4.0 .16 1.1 1.39 3.5 8.89 3.8 .88 4.0 1.24 2.4
F15TO19 5.25 1.6 .22 1.6 .92 2.3 3.20 1.3 .15 .7 1.19 2.2
F20TO24 .17 .1 .14 .9 .13 .3 2.64 1.0 .28 1.2 .47 .8
F25TO60 5.79 1.9 .00 .0 .63 1.7 3.21 1.4 .06 .3 .25 .5
HEDYRS .32 4.6 .01 2.2 .05 5.5 .22 5.1 .02 3.7 .04 4.4
SC .95 1.9 .04 1.6 .03 .6 .10 .3 .08 2.5 .04 .5
ST 1.52 1.3 .15 1.9 .16 1.1 .99 2.4 .04 1.0 .26 2.9
MUSLIM 4.17 3.0 .45 3.4 .14 .8 .73 1.8 .10 2.5 .10 1.2
CHRISTN … … … … … … .21 .2 .18 1.1 .16 .5
INTERCEP 6.64 1.1 .94 1.3 1.55 .4 .92 1.1
Adjusted 2R .3631 .4136 .4386 .2402 .2983 .4275
N 949 725 838 1,979 1,850 1,435
Dependent variable mean .0868 .8469 2.5700 .0427 .7216 3.3266
Expenditure elasticity .97 1.11
P-value:
Age 5–9 .83 .29 .27 .93 .80 .59
Age 10–14 .84 .31 .86 .29 .09 .57
Age 15–19 .00 .02 .00 .00 .01 .03
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Variable
Kerala Maharashtra
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE 1.42 2.4 .05 3.1 .07 1.0 .67 2.3 .20 6.3 .49 8.2
LNHHSIZE 2.52 4.1 .13 7.5 .08 1.0 1.63 5.3 .37 10.1 .01 .1
M0TO4 5.52 1.6 .09 1.2 1.00 2.2 5.76 2.7 .42 1.9 2.20 4.7
M5TO9 10.65 3.2 .48 5.2 .81 2.0 5.65 2.8 1.18 5.4 .11 .3
M10TO14 17.74 5.7 .61 6.1 1.47 3.8 10.12 4.9 1.22 5.5 1.11 2.6
M15TO19 14.49 4.4 .25 3.0 1.50 3.7 11.48 5.6 .66 3.2 1.65 3.9
M20TO24 1.53 .5 .06 .8 .21 .5 3.51 1.6 .07 .3 .34 .8
M25TO60 .96 .3 .10 1.5 .35 .9 .89 .4 .13 .6 .12 .3
M61MORE 4.85 1.1 .03 .3 .55 1.0 2.23 .8 .21 .7 .51 .8
F0TO4 4.11 1.2 .05 .6 1.15 2.6 4.88 2.3 .48 2.2 1.92 4.1
F5TO9 9.07 2.7 .42 4.6 .66 1.5 4.76 2.3 1.02 4.6 .12 .3
F10TO14 18.82 6.2 .70 6.0 1.64 4.3 8.93 4.3 .70 3.2 1.24 2.9
F15TO19 14.49 4.6 .24 3.1 1.74 4.5 4.21 2.0 .13 .6 1.27 2.8
F20TO24 3.72 1.1 .05 .7 .66 1.4 1.91 .8 .25 1.1 .04 .1
F25TO60 4.13 1.4 .21 3.0 .15 .4 .15 .1 .13 .6 .12 .3
HEDYRS .38 4.4 .01 3.0 .03 2.6 .27 6.1 .02 4.5 .03 4.0
SC .44 .7 .00 .2 .09 1.0 .09 .3 .01 .2 .00 .0
ST 1.36 .5 … … .03 .1 1.18 2.8 .09 1.9 .32 3.6
MUSLIM .21 .3 .01 .3 .05 .6 .29 .4 .04 .5 .04 .3
CHRISTN 1.08 2.1 .00 .2 .07 1.1 1.86 .9 … … .31 .8
INTERCEP 19.99 3.3 2.94 3.8 1.45 .5 .09 .1
Adjusted 2R .3416 .4642 .3623 .2855 .4027 .3518
N 948 772 809 2,039 1,874 1,507
Dependent variable mean .0788 .8199 2.6175 .0474 .7161 3.0901
Expenditure elasticity 1.18 .86
P-value:
Age 5–9 .50 .33 .57 .50 .26 .37
Age 10–14 .63 .45 .51 .36 .00 .63
Age 15–19 .99 .88 .41 .00 .00 .20
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Variable
Madhya Pradesh Orissa
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE 1.34 6.2 .35 9.0 .03 .5 1.34 4.1 .27 5.0 .08 .8
LNHHSIZE 1.87 10.4 .57 17.0 .04 .7 1.65 5.6 .47 9.2 .09 1.0
M0TO4 .17 .1 .35 1.4 .48 .9 1.63 .7 .18 .5 .18 .2
M5TO9 6.55 4.5 1.03 4.3 .84 1.8 4.73 2.0 1.58 4.4 .27 .4
M10TO14 9.57 6.6 1.50 6.1 1.82 3.8 7.82 3.3 1.72 4.7 1.50 2.1
M15TO19 9.00 6.1 .66 2.7 2.60 5.3 8.64 3.7 .63 1.8 2.57 3.5
M20TO24 3.57 2.2 .18 .7 1.17 2.1 2.67 1.1 .04 .1 1.44 1.9
M25TO60 1.19 .8 .06 .2 .25 .5 1.82 .8 .28 .8 .29 .4
M61MORE 2.26 1.1 .01 .0 .60 .8 .48 .2 .20 .5 .39 .4
F0TO4 .27 .2 .23 .9 .56 1.1 1.27 .5 .39 1.1 .34 .5
F5TO9 4.89 3.3 .76 3.2 .83 1.7 4.99 2.2 .81 2.3 .82 1.2
F10TO14 8.75 6.0 .84 3.5 1.68 3.5 8.37 3.6 .99 2.8 1.46 2.1
F15TO19 4.00 2.6 .22 .9 1.43 2.8 3.65 1.6 .07 .2 1.08 1.5
F20TO24 .88 .5 .38 1.4 .34 .6 2.60 1.1 .01 .0 .62 .8
F25TO60 2.59 1.8 .19 .8 .48 1.0 4.40 1.9 .92 2.6 1.02 1.4
HEDYRS .31 11.7 .05 10.2 .05 6.8 .28 6.4 .04 6.3 .04 3.5
SC .34 1.8 .09 2.9 .08 1.4 1.15 3.9 .04 .9 .38 4.5
ST .58 3.0 .10 3.1 .16 2.6 1.43 3.9 .18 3.2 .32 2.9
MUSLIM .14 .3 .11 1.3 .11 .8 2.47 2.3 .11 .6 .62 2.3
CHRISTN 1.79 1.4 .00 .0 .01 .0 2.14 2.0 .20 1.5 .30 1.1
INTERCEP 15.62 6.0 4.21 5.3 10.72 2.9 3.02 2.8
Adjusted 2R .3443 .3636 .4579 .3031 .4009 .3165
N 3,305 3,221 2,036 1,522 1,442 979
Dependent variable mean .0297 .6129 3.4757 .0305 .6526 3.5070
Expenditure elasticity 1.45 1.44
P-value:
Age 5–9 .03 .02 .96 .83 .00 .11
Age 10–14 .31 .00 .57 .69 .00 .91
Age 15–19 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
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Variable
Punjab Rajasthan
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE 1.21 2.5 .26 5.8 .12 .9 .10 .4 .26 7.2 .40 6.3
LNHHSIZE 2.01 4.2 .32 6.6 .20 1.5 2.39 7.8 .51 11.2 .19 2.3
M0TO4 4.34 1.2 .06 .2 2.33 2.3 2.85 1.2 .14 .5 .80 1.3
M5TO9 6.53 1.8 1.21 3.6 .07 .1 6.73 2.9 1.02 3.4 1.71 3.0
M10TO14 6.96 2.0 1.16 3.6 .04 .0 11.59 4.8 1.95 6.2 2.49 4.2
M15TO19 7.40 2.1 .20 .6 1.28 1.3 10.16 4.2 .69 2.2 2.89 4.8
M20TO24 4.39 1.2 .00 .0 1.03 1.0 4.56 1.7 .46 1.4 1.91 2.9
M25TO60 1.56 .4 .04 .1 .50 .5 4.14 1.6 .24 .7 1.42 2.1
M61MORE .15 .0 .06 .1 .57 .4 4.32 1.3 .09 .2 2.46 2.8
F0TO4 7.14 2.0 .05 .2 3.46 3.3 1.87 .8 .22 .7 .17 .3
F5TO9 3.55 1.0 .83 2.5 .63 .6 2.71 1.1 .46 1.5 1.21 2.0
F10TO14 4.15 1.2 1.06 3.3 .38 .4 5.05 2.1 .65 2.1 1.61 2.8
F15TO19 4.93 1.3 .03 .1 .66 .7 1.34 .5 .37 1.1 1.03 1.6
F20TO24 7.79 1.9 .40 1.1 1.05 .9 2.16 .7 .45 1.2 1.82 2.4
F25TO60 2.37 .7 .17 .5 .72 .7 2.36 1.0 .26 .9 1.77 2.8
HEDYRS .42 6.8 .02 3.5 .06 3.7 .33 7.6 .02 4.0 .06 5.9
SC .49 1.3 .01 .3 .30 2.8 .63 2.4 .06 1.7 .12 2.0
ST 2.62 .7 .11 1.1 .16 .2 1.15 2.6 .14 2.3 .21 1.9
MUSLIM .04 .0 .13 1.1 .11 .3 .58 .9 .03 .4 .12 .7
CHRISTN .10 .1 … … .41 1.2 … … … … … …
INTERCEP 9.43 1.8 2.52 1.7 7.48 2.3 2.83 3.5
Adjusted 2R .2898 .3208 .2731 .2861 .3627 .3594
N 964 916 720 1,599 1,592 1,063
Dependent variable mean .0456 .7336 3.3441 .0353 .6677 3.3213
Expenditure elasticity 1.27 1.03
P-value:
Age 5–9 .18 .06 .33 .00 .00 .10
Age 10–14 .22 .66 .55 .00 .00 .00
Age 15–19 .26 .22 .33 .00 .00 .00
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Variable
Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE 1.78 4.0 .28 5.0 .07 .6 .37 1.9 .20 7.7 .41 8.2
LNHHSIZE 2.19 4.3 .55 8.0 .01 .1 1.97 9.2 .44 14.5 .05 .8
M0TO4 2.08 .6 .64 1.7 1.16 1.3 2.71 1.5 .41 1.8 .58 1.3
M5TO9 9.19 2.8 2.06 5.2 .15 .2 4.16 2.4 .61 2.8 .66 1.5
M10TO14 11.73 3.6 2.03 4.9 .93 1.1 5.69 3.3 .95 4.3 1.18 2.7
M15TO19 6.55 2.0 .34 .9 1.46 1.6 7.15 4.1 .12 .5 2.36 5.3
M20TO24 2.65 .8 .38 1.0 .12 .1 5.32 2.8 .13 .5 1.52 3.0
M25TO60 1.15 .3 .24 .7 .81 .9 2.27 1.2 .10 .4 .83 1.7
M61MORE .77 .2 .30 .6 .25 .2 1.79 .8 .26 .9 1.19 1.9
F0TO4 1.31 .4 .53 1.4 1.68 1.9 2.23 1.2 .38 1.7 .31 .7
F5TO9 6.63 2.0 1.54 4.0 .06 .1 1.85 1.1 .15 .7 .60 1.4
F10TO14 9.50 3.0 1.60 4.4 .58 .7 4.43 2.5 .16 .7 1.26 2.9
F15TO19 4.88 1.5 .17 .4 .35 .4 .06 .0 .48 2.1 .97 2.1
F20TO24 4.01 1.0 .80 1.9 1.66 1.5 .82 .4 .50 2.0 .24 .5
F25TO60 3.55 1.1 .08 .2 .10 .1 1.60 .9 .21 1.0 .30 .7
HEDYRS .27 4.5 .02 2.8 .05 3.3 .36 13.3 .04 10.3 .07 10.4
SC .70 1.8 .01 .1 .19 2.0 .89 4.6 .09 3.7 .21 4.2
ST 1.49 .7 .09 .4 .07 .1 .57 .9 .15 2.0 .03 .2
MUSLIM .52 .4 .15 .9 .23 .7 1.22 4.7 .15 4.5 .12 1.9
CHRISTN .36 .4 .15 1.1 .02 .1 6.78 1.5 … … .92 1.1
INTERCEP 19.00 4.1 3.57 2.8 7.00 2.8 1.63 2.6
Adjusted 2R .2136 .4236 .3096 .2550 .3171 .2738
N 916 872 624 3,337 3,190 2,229
Dependent variable mean .0350 .6651 3.4513 .0363 .6602 3.3172
Expenditure elasticity 1.51 1.10
P-value:
Age 5–9 .17 .02 .83 .01 .00 .82
Age 10–14 .26 .09 .44 .19 .00 .72
Age 15–19 .39 .44 .05 .00 .00 .00
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Variable
West Bengal Assam
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Unconditional
OLS (ESHARE)
Probit
(ANYEDEXP)
Conditional
OLS
(LNESHARE)
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
Coefﬁcient
# 100 t-Value
Marginal
Effect t-Value Coefﬁcient t-Value
LNPCE 1.03 3.1 .29 5.4 .24 2.2 1.16 2.6 .30 4.9 .23 2.0
LNHHSIZE 1.36 4.2 .61 11.1 .14 1.2 2.16 3.9 .51 7.0 .05 .4
M0TO4 5.38 1.9 .68 1.5 2.08 2.3 1.31 .4 .52 1.3 .18 .2
M5TO9 1.44 .5 .59 1.3 1.69 1.9 6.86 1.9 .83 2.0 .63 .7
M10TO14 3.42 1.2 .65 1.5 .37 .4 11.93 3.3 1.13 2.6 2.11 2.3
M15TO19 3.93 1.4 .12 .3 1.14 1.3 19.64 5.1 .43 1.0 3.44 3.6
M20TO24 .27 .1 .69 1.5 .01 .0 8.03 2.0 .62 1.4 3.90 3.8
M25TO60 3.90 1.4 .46 1.0 1.26 1.3 .34 .1 .62 1.5 .76 .8
M61MORE 6.07 1.7 .75 1.4 .51 .4 .96 .2 .73 1.4 1.46 1.3
F0TO4 5.49 2.0 1.20 2.7 2.15 2.4 2.92 .8 .56 1.3 .11 .1
F5TO9 1.31 .5 .43 1.0 1.20 1.4 7.53 2.1 .87 2.1 .41 .5
F10TO14 4.59 1.7 .71 1.6 .17 .2 9.96 2.7 .94 2.1 1.80 1.9
F15TO19 1.92 .7 .46 1.0 .12 .1 15.70 4.1 .59 1.4 2.60 2.7
F20TO24 .48 .2 .32 .7 .99 1.0 14.99 3.6 .35 .8 2.77 2.6
F25TO60 .51 .2 .28 .6 .92 1.0 8.65 2.3 .22 .5 .91 .9
HEDYRS .40 8.6 .04 6.1 .11 7.4 .32 5.6 .04 5.1 .07 4.5
SC 1.08 3.4 .12 2.5 .13 1.3 1.19 1.9 .09 1.0 .21 1.4
ST .64 .8 .13 1.2 .16 .6 .11 .2 .10 1.2 .06 .3
MUSLIM 1.23 3.0 .17 2.8 .14 1.1 1.84 2.1 .19 1.7 .07 .3
CHRISTN 1.08 1.0 .04 .3 .26 .8 .49 .4 .03 .2 .55 1.6
INTERCEP 6.93 1.8 1.08 .8 16.58 3.2 3.46 2.6
Adjusted 2R .3066 .3246 .3794 .4244 .3963 .4677
N 1,243 1,235 768 941 786 707
Dependent variable mean .0292 .6154 3.6473 .0428 .7023 3.3651
Expenditure elasticity 1.35 1.27
P-value:
Age 5–9 .92 .41 .29 .67 .84 .55
Age 10–14 .44 .78 .67 .35 .55 .51
Age 15–19 .24 .18 .08 .11 .59 .17
Note. All equations include village ﬁxed effects. For the unconditional OLS, the dependent variable is ESHARE or the budget share of education and coefﬁcients have been multiplied by 100. For the
conditional OLS, i.e., that ﬁtted only on households with positive ESHARE, the dependent variable is the natural log of ESHARE, or LNESHARE. The dependent variable in the probit is ANYEDEXP,
i.e., whether household had any positive education expenditure in past year, as opposed to zero education spending. Where a variable predicts success perfectly, that is indicated with ellipses (. . .).
For example, where all Christian households have ANYEDEXPpp1, then the marginal effect of that variable is not identiﬁed and it is denoted with ellipses (. . .). Similarly, if there are no Christians in
the rural part of a state in the sample, this is denoted with ellipses (. . .). The last three rows present the P-values of F-test that, in a given age group, the coefﬁcients of male and female demographic
variables in that model/column are equal. The number of observations on which the probit equation is ﬁtted is usually somewhat smaller than the number of observations on which the unconditional
ESHARE equation is ﬁtted; this is because we have included village ﬁxed effects, so any villages in which all sample households take the value of 0 or of 1 (for ANYEDEXP) perfectly predict failure/
success and drop out.
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